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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY USSR (Chernigovskaya Oblast)

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT Kolkhoz i/n Chapayev

DATE DISTR. 11 February 1954

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REQUIREMENT NO. RD 25X1A

REFERENCES

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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1. Source was unable to sketch an outline of the boundaries of the Kolkhoz i/n Chapayev but stated that it surrounded the village of Slout (N 51-45, E 33-48).

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2. the map NM-36-2, AMS Series N, 501, Scale 1:250,000 accurately portrays the road and railroad network in the Slout area with one exception: it does not show a road running from Slout to Gorely (N 51-48, E 33-52).

3. According to source, an area of about 10 hectares was planted with trees just east of Slout on the ground of the Kolkhoz i/n Chapayev. He knew of no other forestation program.

4. Communist Party control over the kolkhozniki was carried out by the kolkhoz chairman and the brigade leaders. Kolkhozniki were constantly being urged on to greater efforts in their work. Severe penalties were meted out for failure to fulfill the minimum number of labor days (trudoden) for the year and for such offenses as digging up frozen potatoes or taking a few handfuls of grain. It was also virtually impossible to obtain permission to leave the kolkhoz. Any complaints about the meager payments for the trudodni were construed to be anti-State sentiments. The kolkhozniki had no control over their own fate but could only silently accept what was told or given them.

5. During 1948 and 1948 (sic), 100 to 500 students from Glukhov (N 51-40, E 33-56) were sent to the Kolkhoz i/n Chapayev and neighboring kolkhozy to help with the harvesting. They were the only seasonal workers

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6. After World War II, the garden plots of the kolkhozniki in Glukhov Rayon were reduced to three-tenths of a hectare which was the same amount as before the war but less than the kolkhozniki had under the Germans.
7. Communist propaganda had absolutely no effect in inciting the kolkhozniki to increase production but, in fact, often had the opposite effect. The kolkhozniki, tired and annoyed with exhortations to increase production, performed their jobs indifferently and with no enthusiasm.
8. Since the inhabitants of Glukhov Rayon had fared quite well under the German occupation, when the kolkhozniki had been given their own land to work and, in addition, received more grain and flour than at any time under Soviet rule, the kolkhozniki were greatly disgruntled when the Soviets returned and re-established the system of collectivization. The sentiment against collectivization and all the hardships stemming from it was stronger after the war than at any other time.
9. The kolkhozniki did not look favorably upon the increase in the sizes of kolkhozy because it meant an even greater strengthening of collectivization. Source knew very little about agrogorody but felt that the kolkhozniki would also be opposed to them. Not only would agrogorody be the ultimate in collectivization, but they might also mean an end to the garden plots which, however meager, were the basis of the kolkhoznik's existence.
10. Source felt that the MTS (Machine Tractor Station) performed its services quite efficiently. He never had heard complaints about the quality of work done by the MTS, nor had he heard of any MTS deliberately failing to perform contracted work for political reasons.

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